Abstract-Hardware Trojans are a major concern for integrated circuits. All parts of the electronics supply chain are vulnerable to this threat. Trojans can be inserted directly by a rogue employee or through a compromised computer-aided design tool at each step of the design cycle, including an alteration of the design files in the early stages and the fabrication process in a third-party malicious foundry. While Trojan insertion during the latter stages has been largely investigated, we focus on highlevel synthesis (HLS) tools as a likely attack vector. HLS tools are used to generate intellectual property blocks from high-level specifications. To demonstrate the threat, we compromised an open-source HLS tool to inject three examples of HLS-aided hardware Trojans with functional and nonfunctional effects. Our results show that a black-hat HLS tool can be successfully used to maliciously alter electronic circuits to add latency, drain energy, or undermine the security of cryptographic hardware cores. This threat is an important security concern to address.
is in direct competition to the CAD company's IP, the latter has a reason to thwart the design house's IP using malicious tools. Chips developed in one country use tools developed by CAD companies in other countries. If a CAD company's host country wants to spy on the chip-developer's country, it can force the CAD company to create backdoors in the design using national security interest arguments. A hardware Trojan can be always active or stealthy during typical operation, while exceptional conditions trigger its malicious function. Existing protection methods focus on detecting hardware Trojans added after the design phase. In this paper, we look at Trojans that can be introduced during high-level synthesis (HLS). Due to the escalating complexity, cost, and error-proneness of hardware designs, modern SoCs are designed by reusing an increasing number of preexisting components (more than 90% by 2020 [8] ). Automatic HLS is becoming a popular method to support this trend [9] . HLS allows engineers to start from a high-level specification (C/C++/SystemC) and create an optimized hardware description in Verilog/VHDL.
Let us examine the other face of the coin. The register transfer level (RTL) code produced during HLS is machine generated and orders of magnitude bigger than the high-level specification. Hence, it is often difficult for an engineer to understand the behavior and correlate the RTL code with the high-level specification. Formal methods are used to correlate the initial high-level description with the machine-generated hardware design. Since the HLS tools may restructure and optimize code, this correlation is laborious, if not hopeless [10] . Hence, simulation-based methods are the favored solutions to validate HLS-generated designs. Many commercial and academic tools automatically generate hardware testbenches or cosimulation with software specifications to check whether the generated hardware causes similar results as obtained by the software [9] , [11] . This process does not provide complete coverage because exhaustive testing is impossible. This clears the prospect of inserting hardware Trojans at the HLS level without being discovered. Fig. 1 represents the front-end design flow for SoCs. Physical design and manufacturing follow this step to manufacture the SoC. Once the Trojans escape validation in the front end, the subsequent verification processes (e.g., equivalence checking after logic synthesis) believe this compromised RTL design as the golden model.
Due to the increasing use of HLS and the complexity of hardware debugging, we want to address the following question: What is the potential impact of Trojan insertion during HLS? All commercial HLS companies sell proprietary HLS CAD software but also a portfolio of IP components. There is no guarantee that the licensed software is not altered by a rogue employee (e.g., with compromised updates) to insert hardware Trojans and undocumented features. Compromised HLS tools can create components that are less competitive on the market due to repeated failures after a specific time frame (i.e., after the Trojan is activated). Hidden features can be exploited and used in collusion with an IP designer to insert malicious hardware Trojans and compromise the security properties of the resulting IP. For example, hidden features inserted into the design by the HLS developer can be used by the colluding IP designer of a cryptographic core to mark sensitive points of the computation. The real attacker can later access the device and extract the encryption key from the compromised IP. HLS tools are more attractive for Trojan insertion compared to compilers or other CAD tools (e.g., logic synthesis and layout tools) for the following key reasons.
1) While software Trojans can be patched, hardware Trojans are permanent and can create significant economic damages for the users of compromised IPs. 2) HLS can insert a Trojan in early stages of the design flow (e.g., before logic synthesis or layout) and, hence, can create a malicious attack that can impact not only functional but also nonfunctional properties of the design (e.g., latency and energy consumption). 3) There is no formal verification technique able to verify the RTL generated by HLS against the C specification in any circumstances [10] , [12] . Therefore, it is more difficult to detect the Trojans inserted during HLS, especially when they do not affect the functional behavior. Answering the question of how much an HLS tool can be trusted has not been previously studied [3] and is the focus of this research. To highlight the problem, this paper will demonstrate that black-hat HLS tools are easy to create with minimal alterations to the classic HLS tool flow.
A. Contributions and Paper Roadmap
This paper studies how an attacker can create a black-hat HLS tool that introduces malice when creating IP components, along with the potential functional and nonfunctional effects. We start by presenting a classic HLS flow (Section II) and follow it up with presenting our main contributions.
1) A set of HLS-aided hardware Trojans that can backdoor the generated IP components (Section III). 2) A proof-of-concept implementation of three attacks in an open-source HLS tool (Section IV). 3) An analysis of the effects of these HLS-generated hardware Trojans on HLS benchmarks (Section V). We used BAMBU, an open-source framework for research in HLS [13] , to demonstrate that it is easy to compromise HLS tools with disastrous repercussions. Nonfunctional properties (such as latency and energy consumption) are impossible to verify with the current technology, advocating novel specification and validation flows, along with proper security countermeasures.
II. HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS IN A NUTSHELL
The IP blocks are specialized components that have superior performance and energy consumption than the corresponding software. HLS starts from a software-based specification (in C, C++, SystemC, etc.) to generate an RTL description (in Verilog or VHDL) ready for the rest of the design flow (i.e., logic synthesis and physical design).
As shown in Fig. 2(a) , complex HLS-generated components are organized as modules to reduce the design complexity. The hierarchical organization reflects the subfunction organization of the specification. Each hardware component uses the classical finite-state machine (FSM) with data model [14] consisting of two major components: controller and datapath. The controller determines the operations to execute in each clock cycle. The control flow is represented by an FSM that sends signals to the datapath resources based on a set of conditions. The datapath contains the functional units to implement the accelerator functionality and registers to hold temporary values during the computation. Multiplexers drive the values based on the control flow.
The component generation can be divided into three parts, as shown in Fig. 2(b) : 1) the compiler phase, which investigates the input high-level description and applies compilerlevel transformations; 2) the HLS phase, which determines the microarchitecture; and 3) the backend, which generates the Verilog/VHDL description and the associated test benches. RTL simulation is performed on a set of predefined inputs to determine if the generated results match the golden ones obtained from software execution. While HLS-generated IP components are energy-efficient and have high performance, the IP component cannot be altered to add or remove functions after fabrication. Hence, the IP characteristics (e.g., performance and energy consumption) depend on the microarchitecture generated during HLS.
A. Compiler Phase
A traditional HLS flow interacts with compilers (e.g., GCC or LLVM) to parse the input C code, apply compiler optimizations, and produce the resulting intermediate representation (IR) [9] . Most HLS tools exploit the single static assignment form [15] , so that the IR can be conveniently manipulated and translated into hardware (RTL) by the subsequent HLS steps. Compiler transformations such as loop unrolling, constant propagation, and function inlining are applied to optimize the code and enable HLS optimizations (e.g., extraction of instruction-level parallelism). The call graph, which represents the relationship among the functions remaining after optimization, determines the list of modules to synthesize and their hierarchical interconnection.
B. HLS Phase
Each function of the IR is hierarchically transformed into a hardware module. After the selection of resources (called allocation), scheduling is performed to determine the operations to be executed in each clock cycle thereby determining the latency of the circuit. This step also generates the structure of the FSM controller, which implements the control-flow management of the accelerator during execution. Operations scheduled in various clock cycles can potentially reuse the same resources. Temporary values spanning the clock boundaries are stored in registers. Different algorithms can be used for scheduling and binding problems [16] . The last step is interconnection, where the functional units and registers are interconnected with multiplexers. Ultimately, the controller FSM is generated (controller synthesis). Based on the operations to execute and the microarchitecture, the FSM generates the signals that drive the data in the datapath through the multiplexers in each clock cycle.
C. Backend Phase
The VHDL/Verilog description of the component is hierarchically generated, together with the description of the library components (e.g., custom operators or memory interfaces) used in the design. While C-to-RTL formal verification is still an open research problem [10] , RTL simulations are generally preferred to validate the IP behavior. Therefore, HLS tools also generate the corresponding hardware test bench or an interface for cosimulation with the software test bench. A predefined set of inputs is used to generate the golden output values, which are then matched with the simulation results. Advanced debugging methods like discrepancy analysis automatically detect the bug location in case of functional mismatches between hardware and software [12] .
III. ATTACKS ON HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS CAD
IP components execute specialized functions for which they have been designed. However, an attacker can modify the HLS to add extra functionality and compromise the IP component. Differently, from software infections, such malicious functionality cannot be removed after the chip fabrication. This section analyzes three attacks that we envision to be performed during HLS. These attacks influence the performance of the component (degradation), expedite aging or battery consumption (battery exhaustion) and reduce the security level of the component (downgrade). For each attack, we present the threat model, the malicious impacts and the requirements for its integration within an HLS flow so that the hardware Trojan stays undetectable during IP verification.
A. Threat Model
The use of malicious CAD tools is an emerging design threat [3] . In this paper, we assume that the attacker is a rogue developer of an HLS tool. While the risk of detection for major CAD developer is high, rogue employees can install malicious modifications into the tools through the alteration of regular updates to specific users. In addition, many semiconductor design houses rely on small companies for the design of specific IP components. There is no guarantee that all these companies are operating in good faith. IP-design companies with internal HLS tools might be interested in delivering altered IP components or license compromised software to some users for personal interests.
B. Degradation Attack
Computation-intensive kernels that are reused across different applications are excellent candidates for hardware acceleration [17] . Since component reuse is one of the key concepts in reducing design costs, many SoC companies either procure ready-to-use IP or use HLS tools on high-level specifications to create reusable IP. The quality of the resulting SoCs and the market revenues depends on the success of this hardware IP. Faulty units are easily detected and the vendor removes them from the market before selling them. On the contrary, the vendor is responsible for the source of premature failures, which are hard to pinpoint, since they are manifested a long time after the component is in production. Therefore, an attacker is more interested in weakening the HLS tool to impede the long-term quality of the competitor products.
1) Attack Model:
A malicious HLS tool can compromise the quality of IP components by inserting a hardware Trojan that degrades the IP performance when activated. This can be used by a rogue employee to force aging degradation after a certain period of time and undermine the perceived quality and endurance of the components. Consider the C specification in Fig. 3 .
This describes a simple finite-impulse response (FIR) filter to be accelerated in hardware. Input values are stored in a local memory filled before the component execution. HLS can apply transformations to optimize the performance of the resulting IP component. For example, loop unrolling and multiport memories can be combined to execute more operations in parallel [18] . An example of resulting FSM is shown in Fig. 4(a) , where the loop body is repeated for a particular number of times based on the value of the parameter ntaps.
A malicious attacker can insert alternative paths in specific points of the computation. These paths are meant to contain a few empty FSM states (bubbles) instead of useful operations. For example, in Fig. 4(b) , the attacker inserted a bubble after the two memory-read operations. The new path, whose transition edges are colored in red, is executed only when the Trojan is activated, slowing down the computation. From the functional viewpoint, the component performs the exact same function but it takes more cycles to execute when the Trojan is triggered. When the bubbles are inserted in the loop bodies, the latency overhead is repeated as many times as the loop is executed. Since the designer does not possess any information about the FSM before HLS, it is usually hard to determine whether an FSM transition is valid or not. Therefore, traditional logic synthesis-based FSM anomaly detection techniques cannot be applied [19] [20] [21] .
2) Effects: Inserting bubbles to degrade performance does not require modifications to the datapath. The area overhead is due to the extra resources needed to implement the bubble states in the controller. Additional flip-flops may be needed to encode the FSM states, while extra logic ports are needed to encode the additional elements of the output and nextstate functions. Bubbles have negligible effect on the resource requirements of the IP component. In the example shown in Section III-B1, the area overhead is less than 1% when one bubble is inserted. A similar value is obtained when two bubbles are inserted. The bubbles impact the latency of the computation; no valid computation is performed in these bubble states. Consider an 8-tap FIR filter (i.e., the accelerator is configured to execute with ntaps = 8). For this filter, the performance overhead is 3% when one bubble is inserted and 6% when two bubbles are inserted. This overhead is high since the number of cycles required to implement the loop body is relatively small compared to the number of bubbles.
3) HLS Implications: The attacker must consider a few details to insert the bubbles into the FSM. First, the degradation effects must be noticeable after a certain amount of time. In fact, if the Trojan is always active and the component is always slowed down, the designer might decide not to purchase the IP core or the HLS tool. On the contrary, to effectively thwart the company using the compromised IP core, the HLS tool should generate a component that is competitive during its normal execution time and becomes slower only after a predefined amount of time or in case of specific input sequences. Then, the IP component should perform the correct computation in any case, only introducing performance degradation. To ensure a correct computation, bubble states must be designed to avoid computational errors during the transitions between the correct FSM states and the added paths with the FSM bubbles. Each FSM state must finalize the operations that terminate in the corresponding clock cycle (storing the output values in the registers) and creating the new ones (enabling the correct values at the input ports of the assigned functional units). If FSM bubbles are designed to maintain this behavior, the resulting FSM escapes even C-to-HDL formal verification. For example, the compromised IP passes sequential equivalence checking (SEC) because this verification approach is designed to ignore timing introduced by HLS [22] .
C. Battery Exhaustion Attack
SoCs are often battery powered, where efficient energy management is a key design principle. For example, one of the most important criteria when shopping for a new phone is its standby time (the duration of a single battery charge). Hence, SoC-based devices are created with IP cores modified for specialized functions. Contemporary cyber-physical systems involve energy-efficient solutions and may quit operating when the battery drains. This can have repercussions, varying from loss of product competitiveness (planned obsolescence) to system failure. Battery exhaustion can be pulledoff by including useless functionality that drains a considerable amount of current from the battery. This translates into extra power consumption when it is switched on, shortening battery time with no impact on the functionality. 1) Attack Model: Battery exhaustion attack entails altering the datapath to consume a substantial amount of current when the Trojan is activated. The Trojan should be designed on one hand to expedite battery discharging and, on the other hand, to evade power side-channel analysis. The power consumed during normal execution must be acceptable to avoid detecting the Trojan or simply rejecting the component for excessive power consumption. Consider the C specification in Fig. 5 .
This code snippet describes the initial part of the adaptive differential pulse-code modulation (ADPCM) decoder. This algorithm is extracted from the CHStone benchmark suite (adpcm benchmark) [23] . The four operations required to compute d_sl, d_dlt, dl, and rl are scheduled in three clock cycles due to some data dependencies. The resulting scheduling is shown in Fig. 6(a) .
Since the two multiplications are executed in different clock cycles, they can be assigned to the same functional unit. The same applies to the two additions, which are assigned to the same adder. The resulting portion of the datapath microarchitecture is shown in Fig. 6(b) . When the operations are executed, the results are stored in the output registers. These register-write operations are regulated by the controller, which enables the signal wr_en during the respective clock cycles. However, these two functional units are not used in all clock cycles. The attacker can thus assign different input values in these clock cycles, triggering the execution of the combinational functionality and enhancing the dynamic power consumption of the component. If the result of this spurious operation is not stored in any register, there are no computational errors and the Trojan is hard to detect. Since most of the logic is reused, it is also more difficult to generate the golden reference model needed to detect this Trojan using power analysis.
2) Effects: Reusing idle functional units is a powerful technique to perform battery exhaustion attacks. These effects are amplified if the selected units have a larger dynamic power consumption, like multipliers. The area overhead for these alterations is negligible and so the additional static power. They only require a multiplexer to select the correct or fake inputs to the unit and the logic to generate these inputs in a manner that forces a high switching activity. For example, the compromised IP generated from the code in Fig. 5 has an area overhead of around 2%, while the power consumption is enhanced by almost 10% when only five idle functional units are used for implementing the attack.
3) HLS-Level Implications: Extra functions responsible to consume additional power have no functional side effects. Therefore, the corresponding functional units might be optimized out by synthesis tools when their results are never used. This can be solved by reusing functional units that are already present in the datapath for implementing the functionality, as mentioned earlier. Output registers are used in valid computation, while register-write operations are disabled in case of fake operations. These units can be identified by analyzing the scheduling and resource binding resulting after the HLS phase. To force the peak switching activity, we can bit-flip the values currently present as an input to the selected functional units. For example, let val be the current value connected to the input in of a given functional unit (e.g., the output port of the register where the previous value was stored). The connection can be modified as follows to consume extra current:
where sel is a signal representing whether the Trojan is activated. This attack is almost impossible to detect since there are no functional side effects. Entire submodules can be used to consume a substantial amount of power in the same manner as we propose for single functional units. However, the submodules must have specific attributes to be used for battery exhaustion attacks. First, they must not have side effects out of the core, like memory-write operations. Then, the output of the module must be stored in a register and not directly used by the datapath resources of the outermost function. In this way, the Trojan can inhibit the registerwrite operation of the output value as for the functional-unit operations.
Battery exhaustion attacks cannot perform when there are no states with unused functional units. In these cases, a malicious HLS tool must create new states to implement the attack. These states are similar to bubbles for downgrade attacks and this is the only case that introduces performance overheads regarding the total number of clock cycles. However, since there is no golden circuit, the designer is not able to detect it. 
D. Downgrade Attack
Besides the algorithm to implement, a compromised HLS tool can inject a malicious functionality. For example, malicious functions can weaken the security properties of symmetric key cryptographic algorithms (e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [24] or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [25] ). These algorithms use a typical computational style of bit manipulations repeated a predetermined number of rounds. Reducing the number of rounds allows key recovery and undermines the security. Since this attack involves insight into the algorithm, it cannot be fully automated. This attack can be launched by a rogue in an IP design house that has its own HLS tool. A malicious developer can design hidden directives that can be used during IP development to access the undocumented features and generate compromised IP components. These components can be later accessed by the real attacker to extract sensitive information.
1) Attack Model:
To compromise the security of roundbased cryptographic algorithms, it is sufficient to reduce the number of executed rounds. This entails modifying the counter of the executed round. Consider the C specification in Fig. 7 .
The corresponding microarchitecture is shown in Fig. 8 . Such round-based security algorithms can be compromised by downgrading them [26] , [27] . For example, message pairs with collision can be generated for SHA-256 when reducing the rounds from 64 to 18 rounds [26] , while key recovery for AES-128 is simplified when reducing the rounds from 10 to 7 [27] . This can be easily accomplished by modifying the loop constant (SHArounds) or by preloading a value into the counter variable i greater than 0. In both cases, the component executes a reduced number of rounds. In Fig. 8 , the part affected by the modification is highlighted in red.
This attack requires a collusion between the HLS developer and the IP designer to identify how many rounds must be executed and where the modification must be inserted (e.g., which are the counter variable and the constant defining the number of rounds). However, the IP designer, who is usually responsible for IP validation, can simply ignore the mismatch between the expected and the real outputs when it occurs. 2) Effects: Downgrading minimally impacts area since the modification is limited only to the round counter logic. Therefore, the effects on the power consumption are limited, and when the Trojan is inactive, power analysis is not able to identify any anomalies. When the Trojan is activated, the component executes a reduced number of rounds and this compromises the security of the IP core. For example, AES encryption with a reduced number of rounds aids key recovery [27] . Reducing the number of rounds also reduces the energy consumed. However, this is a benevolent effect that is hardly perceived by the user as a problem to be further investigated.
3) HLS Implications: Designing backdoors that support downgrading require not only an analysis of the microarchitecture generated by HLS but also an understanding of the computation. While it is possible to analyze at the compiler level to automatically identify the parts of the specification involving the round computation, it is easier to bring insights from the IP developer including approaches to compromise it. Once the rogue IP developer specifies which counter must be "downgraded" and the maximum number of new rounds, the black-hat HLS tool can create and insert the backdoor. The backdoored design is created in a way to escape the verification steps following HLS even when this is not performed by the IP designer. As discussed in Section II, C-to-RTL verification is not established and designers rely on simulationbased approaches. Hence, the rogue IP developer can create a Trojan that is activated by a very rare condition, which is not provided as a test case to the user.
IV. IMPLEMENTING BLACK-HAT HLS
This section outlines how to build a black-hat HLS tool on top of BAMBU, an open-source HLS framework [13] based on GCC, and insert the Trojans discussed in Section III. BAMBU is a command-line tool with a modular organization. Additional optimizations can be activated by passing specific flags when invoking the tool, while each synthesis step is implemented as a transformation step, called pass. As illustrated in Fig. 9 , these attacks are implemented as additional passes introduced by the rogue HLS developer. These passes can be activated to inject Trojans. To achieve a degradation attack, black-hat BAMBU determines the specific points in the computation where bubbles are inserted and modify the FSM accordingly (details in Section IV-A). To perform battery 
Algorithm 1: Insert FSM Bubbles for a Degradation Attack
exhaustion, black-hat BAMBU selects the functional units that are idle for a particular number of clock cycles in order to generate the microarchitecture with high switching activity (see Section IV-B). Compromising the security standard of round-based cryptographic algorithms requires identifying the variables and create the microarchitecture to enforce a reduced number of rounds (see Section IV-C). All these rogue steps can be enabled via command-line options and are executed between the HLS phase and the back-end phase.
A. Degradation Attack
To maximize the impact of the FSM bubbles, they must be inserted in those points of the computation that is repeated multiple times (e.g., loop bodies). Therefore, blackhat BAMBU uses the scheduling information and implements the algorithm shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm starts from the baseline FSM resulting from the scheduling of the input functionality and inserts a predefined number of bubbles defined by the HLS developer (N). Each alternative path is selected when the Trojan is activated.
This algorithm works at the basic-block (BB) level. A BB represents a part of the computation with a single entry point and a single exit point. Each BB is scheduled and translated into a sequence of states executed serially. The cost of BB i is defined as follows:
where states BB i is the number of states required to perform BB i , and execBB i is an estimate of the number of times the BB executes (e.g., the number of iterations of the loop). b counts the bubbles already introduced in the same part of the code. This is useful when assigning the bubbles in the various parts of the computation. [28] aim at matching the behavior of specifications at different levels of abstraction, ignoring timing differences introduced by HLS. Since this attack does not introduce any behavior modifications but only timing differences, it cannot be detected with SEC methods. Code coverage can detect the baseline degradation attack. However, it is possible to implement a variant that cannot be detected by code coverage at the cost of a small additional overhead. In this variant, the bubble is traversed once in normal operation and multiple times when the trigger is on. The two variants are shown in Fig. 10 . In the first version [see Fig. 10(a) ], there is no performance overhead when the Trojan is inactive, but code coverage analysis identifies that the line in state S_9 is not covered during normal execution. This might induce the designer to perform further analysis. On the contrary, when the tool adopts the solution of Fig. 10(b) , code coverage analysis obtains the same results as in the baseline version (i.e., the one without Trojan) and the Trojan stays undetected. However, this solution has a small overhead (one cycle per execution) when the Trojan is inactive.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to Increase the Power Consumption of Unused Functional Units

B. Battery Exhaustion Attack
To implement battery exhaustion attacks, the black-hat HLS tool must select which functional units are used to increase the power consumption. Similar to the performance degradation attacks, battery exhaustion is implemented as part of the classic HLS. After module binding, it is possible to determine which functional units are idle in each clock cycle. The algorithm for selecting such idle functional units is shown in Algorithm 2 that considers technology-related information (e.g., estimated dynamic power consumption of each type of functional unit).
Given a power consumption budget ( power ), the algorithm modifies the datapath and the FSM controller using a twofold objective: 1) select the functional units that maximize the dynamic power consumption and 2) minimize the number of functional units that are extended with the extra logic to increase the switching activity while minimizing the extra hardware. In function SelectFU, the algorithm selects the functional units by estimating the dynamic power consumption (GetPowerFU-based on library information) and the number of cycles in which they are idle during normal execution (UnusedEstimate-based on profiling details). The information concerning power consumption comes from the technology library used for synthesis, while profiling information is gathered to prefer functional units that are unused regardless of the control flow. The resulting contribution is used to update p until the power budget is reached. In terms of complexity, the algorithm iterates over all functional units of the design (FU List) in the worst case, i.e., the worst case complexity is linear in number of functional units. Fig. 11 shows the microarchitecture that is added to each functional unit to increase dynamic power consumption.
The functional-unit inputs are stored in extra register with bit flipping. The bit flipping with NOT gates and extra registers guarantees the maximum switching activity for each combinational functional unit. Most of the functional units are connected to flip-flops that contain the input values. Often, these flip-flops have an additional port with the complement of the output that can be directly connected to the extra logic. 
1) Attack Detection:
Similar to degradation attacks, this attack does not introduce any behavior modifications and SEC methods are not able to detect anomalies. Since all instructions are executed with the same frequency, code coverage [29] is not able to determine any potential anomaly in the design.
The single line of code shown in Section III-C3, which activates the Trojan, is also covered.
C. Downgrade Attack
The modifications to the IP for the downgrade attack are not automatically implemented inside black-hat BAMBU but rely on annotations from the colluding IP designer. Therefore, to create a compromised IP component, the rogue IP designer marks the variable that is used to track the number of executed rounds and the black-hat HLS flow introduces the microarchitecture to execute a reduced number of rounds. The variable, along with its scope (i.e., the function where it is executed), and the number of rounds are specified through an XML file. Then, the attacker may have an interest in accessing the device, activating the Trojan, and extracting private data only in specific situations. Therefore, we design a trigger to activate the Trojan only in rare conditions. Such a microarchitecture is shown in Fig. 12 and is implemented by a multiplexer that preloads a nonzero value into the counter.
This implementation and the associated overhead are independent of the number of rounds to be executed. Let Rounds and Reduced_Rounds be the number of rounds normally executed and the number of rounds that undermine the security, respectively. The counter is preloaded with the value Counter computed as follows:
The FSM is modified to execute a reduced number of iterations with a dedicated implementation in case of partial or complete unrolling. Instead of modifying the constant to terminate the loop, this implementation operates on the register variable and enables optimizations on the comparator.
1) Attack Detection:
The compromised IP generates behavioral mismatches, which can be exploited to ease key recovery, only when the Trojan is activated, i.e., the attacker gains control of the IP and provides the activation sequence. As long as the Trojan is not triggered, the IP produces correct results and the Trojan stays undetected. The only design modification affects the value of the counter (see Fig. 12 ). However, the corresponding HDL line is always executed to determine to value to pre-load into variable i. Thus, when performing code coverage, all lines are covered.
V. EFFECTS OF HLS ATTACKS
We evaluated the attacks implemented in black-hat BAMBU. We added new command-line options to selectively activate the malicious passes. These options are not listed in the help menu, mimicking the situation where malicious and undocumented features are added to the HLS tool.
We employed the original BAMBU and black-hat BAMBU HLS frameworks to create accelerators for selected kernels from CHStone [23] and MachSuite [17] , two HLS benchmark suites. All benchmarks are specified in C language. BAMBU generates hardware test benches and performs simulationbased validation on an array of input values provided by the user. In each experiment, we used the Synopsys SAED 32-nm Generic Library at 500 MHz. Results pertaining to performance are obtained through RTL simulation with Mentor Graphics ModelSim SE 10.3. The same simulations are also used to compare the golden results obtained by executing the C code on the input values and the ones obtained from the hardware circuits. Area and power results are obtained after logic synthesis and power analysis with Synopsys Design Compiler J-2014.09-SP2. These values represent the baseline of our experiments. The area overhead is computed only on the logic resources, without considering the SRAM. RTL simulations are used to extract SAIF back annotations with accurate switching activity for precise power analysis. We used Synopsys VCS simulator for code coverage analysis. In all cases, we obtained the same results as in the baseline versions.
Next, we explain the activation functions of the Trojans and the effects of the attacks in terms of performance, power, and security when they are activated.
A. Trojan Triggers
The trigger functions of the Trojans must be designed according to the use of the generated IP core and how the attacker plans to compromise the resulting design. For degradation and battery-exhaustion attacks, the attacker is not interested in accessing the device but only to compromise its execution after a predefined amount of time. In these two cases, we use a counter-based trigger (counter) that activates the Trojan after 65 536 executions (i.e., the counter has 16 bits). Designing Trojans that are activated after a larger number iteration requires simply to add a few bits to the counter register. For downgrade attacks, we design an input sequence detector (detector), where the colluding IP designer can specify the input sequence that must be provided to activate the Trojan. The implementation of this unit is simple as it is conceptually equivalent to a string detector.
In both cases, the size of the trigger modules is independent of the functionality of the IP core. Fig. 13 reports the impact of such modules on the area of the entire IP cores (baseline versions). These results demonstrate that trigger functions minimally impact the area (less than 4% in the worst case, being negligible in most cases).
The trigger functions are completely orthogonal to the effects of the three attacks and more complex trigger mechanisms can be easily integrated. However, we have shown that these simple triggers are enough to activate the intended Trojans in the different designs.
B. Trojan Payloads
We will discuss the functional and nonfunctional effects of the proposed Trojans.
1) Degradation Attack:
In case of degradation attacks, we created several variants of compromised IP cores. Each of them has a different number of FSM bubbles. We evaluated the area and performance overheads of these malicious modifications.
The area overhead is negligible in all cases (less than 1%). Indeed, there is no modification to the datapath, while the controller only needs few extra logic gates for the transition and output functions. Fig. 14 illustrates the performance overhead with respect to the baseline versions when varying the number of bubbles. As expected, the overhead is significant and grows as we increase the number of FSM bubbles introduced in the designs. The loop-intensive IP cores are more affected by the bubbles, such as the fft reaching a performance overhead up to 17%. Trojans inserted in cores where the sequential execution is much larger than the code contained in the loops have a minimal impact (see motion). In these cases, the loops have a small impact and cannot maximize the bubble effects. Occasionally, the algorithm does not insert the bubbles in proper points (e.g., adpcm). This is due to a heavy use of pointers and submodules that complicate the computation of the BB costs defined in 1. The optimization of the cost function and the automatic identification of the appropriate number of bubbles to insert are still open problems. The RTL simulations report correct results in all cases, indicating that the degradation attacks introduce no computation errors. Thus, neither simulation-based verification nor SEC can detect these Trojans.
2) Battery Exhaustion Attack: We designed two sets of experiments. First, we determined a particular power budget and evaluated the area overhead necessary to achieve it applying the black-hat algorithm proposed in Section IV-B. Then, we used a simplified version of the same algorithm, where we selected the four most significant functional units (function SelectFU of Algorithm 2) and evaluated the power overhead that can be obtained. In the first set of experiments, we estimated the power consumed by each baseline implementation and assigned an extra 30% power budget to be consumed when the Trojan is activated. Fig. 15 reports the area overhead to implement the extra logic to increase the power consumption (see Section IV-B). The area overhead is generally quite low and, in some cases, negligible. For gsm, a considerable amount of power consumption can be achieved by exploiting a small set of functional units with an area overhead less than 1%. On the contrary, adding extra logic to the benchmarks with many Boolean operations (e.g., motion) has a larger impact on the area (around 15%). Indeed, the logic added to increase power consumption (see Fig. 11 ) has an area comparable with the relative functional units. The second set of experiments reduces the area overhead by modifying only up to four functional units. This way, we obtained an area overhead that is less than 3%. The resulting power overheads with respect to the baseline implementations are illustrated in Fig. 16 . As in the previous case, the benchmarks with idle functional units can achieve a substantial power overhead (over 20% in case of gsm). This attack has a limited impact on simple benchmarks composed of Boolean operations, like the motion. RTL simulations report correct results in all experiments, confirming that battery exhaustion attacks do not introduce computational errors that can be detected with either simulation-based verification or by SEC.
3) Downgrade Attack: We applied the black-hat BAMBU to implement the downgrade attack described in Section IV-C on two cryptographic cores: SHA-256 and AES-128. They are two of the most popular (round-based) cryptographic algorithms for which several hardware implementations were explored and also compromised [26] . Starting from the C descriptions publicly available, we specified the round counter variables in the XML file that is passed on to black-hat BAMBU, together with the list of four rare input values to generate the detector trigger of the Trojans (see Section V-A). Black-hat BAMBU generates the microarchitecture of these two cores augmented with the Trojan logic shown in Fig. 12 . The trust-level of these algorithms depends on the number of iterations that are executed. If the algorithms execute a number of rounds below a certain value, the cores become vulnerable. For each benchmark, we designed different versions concerning the number of rounds to execute. Table I reports the values that we used together with the area/power overhead. From the functional perspective, we performed extensive RTL simulations of the generated hardware with several input values that were randomly generated. These simulations did not activate the Trojans in any cases, indicating that the detector trigger and the given input sequence is robust against accidental activations during validation or normal execution. Next, we provided the trigger sequence of input values to activate the Trojans, and we verified that the IP executes the reduced number of iterations requested by the attacker. The area overhead of the compromised IP cores is negligible (less than 3%-see Table I ) regardless the trust-level of the cores (i.e., the number of iterations). The logic for the triggers (see Section V-A) accounts for most of the overhead (more than 2%), while the payload of these Trojans (the microarchitecture outlined in Section IV-C) is minimal since it requires only an extra multiplexer (less than 1%). Also, the power overhead is minimal. It is worth noting that the key recovery is not performed with power side-channel attacks but with analysis of the output values. Table II compares the three attacks. For each of them, we describe the attacker's goal and the type of trigger used for activation. Also, we report a brief description of the Trojan implementation along with its main effect when it is activated. Finally, we describe the side effects (e.g., the overheads) when they are injected.
4) Final Remarks:
VI. RELATED WORK
Hardware Trojans are a serious concern for the security of SoC architectures [30] . They may have different characteristics and activities, varying from simple modifications of the circuits to alteration of the manufacturing process [31] . While there are several techniques to detect hardware Trojans (including machine-learning-based approaches [32] ), the problem of guaranteeing a Trojan-free chip is still unsolved. Hardware performance counters (HPCs) are architectural features that are used to monitor the system execution. However, they are not suitable for detecting hardware Trojans. HPCs can detect malware assuming that the underlying hardware is trusted. If the hardware is untrusted (i.e., hardware Trojans exist), this technique cannot apply.
Existing threat models assume an attack during manufacturing since design houses outsource the chip fabrication to thirdparty foundries. Until now, CAD tools were mostly assumed trustworthy [33] . HLS can generate additional logic to detect security violations or thwart attack [34] , [35] . Trustworthy HLS-generated designs are also vulnerable to a wide range of security violations [8] . Malicious logic synthesis has been explored in [20] and [36] . The research showed that logic synthesis tools can insert a Trojan by modifying the FSM of the design. However, the authors did not discuss robustness of these attacks against postsynthesis verification tools like logical equivalence checkers (LECs). We devised an experiment to determine whether commercial state-of-the-art LEC tools Fig. 17(b) , which gets detected as "nonequivalent".
can detect these attacks. Let us consider a sequence detector, as shown using the FSM in Fig. 17(a) . All transitions are not defined in this FSM. For example, the next state of the system when the current state is B and the input is 0 has not been defined. A malicious logic-synthesis tool can take advantage of undefined transitions and create an FSM with an extra transition, as shown in red in Fig. 17(b) . These types of attacks are generally known as transition-based attacks. These extra transitions are used by a malicious synthesis tool to create vulnerabilities in the design without changing the original functionality. In the FSM described in Fig. 17(a) , if one wants to travel from state B to state A, she has to travel via state C. In the modified FSM in Fig. 17(b) , the malicious CAD tool creates a backdoor to transition from B to A.
The malicious logic synthesis tool can introduce another attack, which entails adding an extra state [19] . The malicious synthesis tool finds whether extra states can be added. Consider the FSM in Fig. 17(a) . Although two flip-flops can completely represent four states, this FSM comprises of only three states. An adversary can add an additional state to this FSM. Along with the extra state and using the undefined transitions like transition attack, a malicious tool creates vulnerabilities as described in red in Fig. 17(b) . The additional state adds a backdoor to the design. This attack (which we call extra state attack) is similar to the "degradation attack" proposed in Section III-B. These are the two attacks introduced by logic synthesis tools as described in [19] [20] [21] .
We used the original FSM in Fig. 17(a) and synthesized it to a netlist. Both sets of vulnerabilities are introduced in the netlist. We use Cadence Conformal LEC tool for equivalence checking between the RTL and the netlist. Conformal LEC was able to detect both vulnerabilities, thus, validating our claim. The Conformal LEC report, shown in Fig. 18 , detects nonequivalent portions in the two designs.
Moreover, researchers have proposed several techniques to detect these class of attacks by logic synthesis tools [19] [20] [21] . Hence, logic synthesis attacks can be detected. Although HLS-inserted Trojans are similar to logic synthesis-inserted ones, the proposed attacks are robust against these techniques since the designer does not have an FSM in the original design. Since the designer uses high-level languages such as C, C++, or System C for HLS, he/she is agnostic to the states and transitions in the resulting FSM. Hence, the concepts of "extra transitions" and "extra states" do not exist for HLS. While HLS is becoming popular as a productive tool for design [9] , related verification methods are premature. In the future, security verification must consider functional and nonfunctional properties of HLS-generated modules.
Layout tools can insert Trojans by modifying the GDSII files. They can use the vacant spaces in the design and insert a Trojan, which can be triggered using existing wires and signals [37] . This threat model is restrictive in that the attacker cannot increase the dimensions of the chip. He/she has to leverage white spaces in the layout to realize this attack. The layout-based attack is difficult to realize for two reasons as follows.
1) The attacker has to rigorously reverse engineer the layout to identify signals that could enable the trigger. 2) The attacker does not have information about the test cases used to test the IP. The testing company might design an intelligent test case to detect this Trojan. HLS-based Trojans can make larger modifications to the designs. During HLS, it is known which functional units are used/unused, and it is easier to create extra connections without altering the functionality.
In the software domain, a compiler can insert a backdoor in a login program. This would allow a login whenever a special password (known only to the Trojan horse designer) is entered [38] , undermining the security of the system. This is similar to the downgrade attack. Extra routines can be added to perform useless computation and degrade performance or waste power consumption. However, these attacks can be identified and removed by substituting the compromised binary.
HLS verification techniques compare the golden function with the generated hardware to detect mismatches. Discrepancy analysis is a novel technique to identify differences between software and hardware execution [11] . However, one cannot identify nonfunctional discrepancies and attacks such as performance degradation and battery exhaustion. In downgrade attacks, we assume collusion between the HLS developer and the IP designer. This model assumes multilevel attacks, wherein two or more parties conspire have been demonstrated [39] . If the HLS tool is compromised, discrepancy analysis may be compromised as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a proof-of-concept implementation of a blackhat HLS framework that can introduce a variety of hardware Trojans that are challenging to detect. Classic HLS flows can be altered minimally to aid increase in latency or power consumption and to compromise the security of the generated IP cores. For example, the proposed downgrade attack can be used to obtain confidential information from the design. HLS and other CAD tools, in general, are potential attack surfaces advocating methods to verify functional and nonfunctional properties of the IP, along with proper countermeasures.
